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LIMITING THE BOUNDARIES OF STANLEY V ILLINOIS.-
CABAN V MOHAMMED
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Stanley v. Illinois,' the
rights of putative fathers in adoption proceedings were largely ignored.
Generally, only the consent of the unmarried mother was required before the
children could be adopted, whereas the putative father's consent was not
required. 2 Stanley signified the first attempt by the Court to accord recogni-
tion to the rights of putative fathers. Since Stanley, the rights of putative
fathers have received increasing attention and consequent constitutional
protection.
The most recent Supreme Court decision exemplifying this change in
attitude toward putative fathers is Caban v. Mohammed.3 In Caban, the Court
held that an adoption statute requiring the consent of an unmarried mother
but not the consent of a putative father before their child could be adopted
violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
4
The Caban decision limited the boundaries of the constitutional protec-
tion that would be extended to putative fathers as first enunciated in Stanley.
This comment will analyze the limited nature of this newly recognized right
by tracing its development in Stanley to its refinement in Caban.
I. CABAN < MOHAMMED
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed had two children during the five
years that they lived together unmarried. 5 Both parents contributed to the
children's support, and Caban was identified as the father on the children's
birth certificates. 6 After the couple separated, Maria married Kazim Mo-
hammed, and they petitioned to adopt the children. 7 Caban filed a cross-
petition to adopt the children.8
The New York statute9 in question required the consent of both parents
before adoption of a legitimate child, but required only the consent of the
1. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Comment, The Emerging Constitutonal Protection of the ttatie Father's Parental
Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1583-84 (1972). For a listing of state statutes regarding the
putative father's consent to adoption shortly after Stanle was decided, see 61 CORNELL L. REV.
312, 312-13 n.4 (1976).
3. 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
4. Id at 1768-69.
5. Id at 1763.
6. Id
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1764.
9. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § l1(1)(b)-(c) (McKinney 1977). Section 111 was amended
after the Surrogate Court proceedings. The amendment added § 11 1(2)(a) which provided that
the consent of a parent or custodian would not be required if either evinced an intent to forego
parental or custodial obligations for six months. Also added was § 111(6) which outlined condi-
tions under which consent could be dispensed with in accordance with § 111(2) (a).
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unmarried mother before adoption of an illegitimate child. Therefore,
Caban could not block the adoption of his children by withholding his con-
sent as all other classes of parents could. The Surrogate Court, granting the
adoption to Maria and Kazim Mohammed, was affirmed by the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,10 and the New York Court of Ap-
peals. "
On appeal, the Supreme Court, with Justice Powell writing for the ma-
jority, struck down the statute on equal protection grounds due to the sex-
based discrimination between unmarried mothers and putative fathers.
12
No procedural due process issue was raised.13 The Court declined to pass on
the substantive due process issue of whether parental rights could be termi-
nated absent a fitness hearing, stating that it was unnecessary to reach this
issue as the statute was struck down on equal protection grounds.'
4
Caban represented the third time the Supreme Court had addressed the
issue of putative fathers' rights in custody and adoption proceedings. One
cannot gain a true perspective of the constitutional protection extended to
putative fathers by reading Caban in a vacuum. In order to determine the
boundaries of this newly recognized right, Caban must be analyzed in light of
the Supreme Court's two previous decisions in this area, Stanley v. Illinois'5
and Quilloin v. Walcott. 16 Only then can the limited nature of this right be
fully comprehended.
II. RECOGNIZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE
FATHERS: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Initial Step.- Stanley v. Illinois
In Stanley, 17 an unmarried couple had three children during the eight-
een years that they had lived together intermittently. Under Illinois law,' 8
when the mother died, the putative father's illegitimate children became
wards of the state. Stanley protested this action, claiming that it was a viola-
tion of equal protection, since all other classes of parents, e.g., unmarried
mothers and married parents, could not be deprived of the custody of their
children unless they were found unfit.' 9 Stanley, in contrast, simply because
he was a putative father, could have his children taken away from him with-
out a fitness hearing. The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of due
process, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his parental fitness before his
children could be taken away from him.
20
10. In re David Andrew C., 56 A.D.2d 622, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1977) (mem.).
11. In re Adoption of David A.C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977)
(mem.).
12. 99 S. Ct. at 1768-69.
13. Id at 1764 n.3.
14. Id at 1769 n.16.
15. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
16. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
17. 405 U.S. 645.
18. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-14, 702-1, 702-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
19. 405 U.S. at 646.
20. Id. at 658.
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Stanley was decided primarily on procedural due process grounds2 ' and
is classified as an irrebuttable presumption case. 22 The basis of the Court's
rationale was that a state could not presume that all putative fathers were
unfit to raise their children upon the mother's death. Since a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest was involved, that of a "man in the children he
has sired and raised,"'23 Stanley was entitled to procedural due process pro-
tection. The administrative convenience in presuming that all putative fa-
thers were unfit without giving them a hearing on their fitness was not a
sufficient state interest to justify this irrebuttable presumption.
2 4
Stanle held that a putative father who had actual custody of his chil-
dren could not be deprived of legal custody without a fitness hearing; but
Stanley left unresolved the extent of constitutional protection that would be
afforded to putative fathers. Chief Justice Burger commented in his dissent
that the majority opinion, by invalidating the Illinois statute, had embarked
"on a novel concept of the natural law for unwed fathers that could well
have strange boundaries as yet undiscernible.
' 25
The "strange boundaries" the Chief Justice referred to turn on whether
Stanley is interpreted narrowly as a procedural due process case or whether
Stanley is read broadly as a substantive due process case26 as well. The differ-
ence in result is substantial.
If putative fathers are only afforded procedural protection before their
parental rights are terminated, then they are entitled to notice and a "prop-
erly focused" 27 hearing. Under this interpretation, a "properly focused"
hearing may consist of a hearing solely on the best interests of the child and
not on the putative father's fitness. If so, then the putative father's rights can
21. The case was also decided on equal protection grounds although the equal protection
holding was derived from the due process analysis. After the Court held that Stanley was enti-
tled to a fitness hearing, the Court further held that "[I]t follows that denying such a hearing to
Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to
the Equal Protection Clause." Id
22. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASES & MATERIALS ON CONSTrrLrrIONAL LAw 888-95 (1975).
23. 405 U.S. at 651.
24. Id at 656-58. The Court noted that the cost of offering interested putative fathers a
fitness hearing was minimal. Id at 657 n.9.
25. Id at 668 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
26. Szanlt contained language suggesting that the Court was declaring the putative fa-
ther's interest in his child to be a fundamental right. As such, it could not be terminated with-
out his consent absent unfitness. The relevant language is as follows:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protec-
tion. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children . . . . [is cognizable and substantial].
• . .The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essen-
tial,' . . . 'basic civil rights of man' . . . .
Id at 651-52 (citations omitted). The Court also noted that constitutional protection extends to
family relationships involving unmarried couples. Id at 651.
27. Part of the confusion that has arisen in interpreting Stanly can be attributed to foot-
note nine. In this important footnote, the Court notes that a state must give fathers like Stanley
a "properly focused hearing in a custody or adoption proceeding." Id. at 657 n.9. The Court
failed to define what type of hearing constitutes a "properly focused" hearing. To add to the
confusion, the Court also indicated in this footnote that the cost of a fitness hearing to the state
would be minimal, implying that a "properly focused" hearing is a fitness hearing. Quitloin,
however, intimates that a "properly focused" hearing may also be a hearing on the child's best
interests. See 434 U.S. at 255.
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be terminated even though he is not found unfit and has not consented to
the adoption-if the adoption is in the child's best interests.
If Stanley grants a putative father substantive rights, then the hearing
must be on the father's fitness, and the father must be found unfit before his
parental rights can be terminated. If he is fit, then his consent will be re-
quired for adoption. Consequently, the functional effect of interpreting Stan-
ley as a substantive due process case is to give putative fathers the same
constitutional protection accorded to all other classes of parents.
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the interest of a
parent in his or her child is a fundamental right. 28 As such, any state inter-
ference with a fundamental right will be subjected to the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review requiring the state to show a compelling state interest to
justify the interference with the fundamental right.2 9 As applied to adoption
proceedings, this rule requires a state to first find a parent unfit before the
state can terminate parental rights unless the parent consents to the adop-
tion.
Giving Stanley a substantive due process interpretation could seriously
hinder the adoption process because a child could only be adopted if his
putative father were found unfit or had consented. The putative father
would have a strong veto authority over the adoption which might be exer-
cised adversely to the child's best interests even though the putative father
may not have assumed the full parental responsibilities and obligations nor-
mally borne by all other parents. This rationale was the basis for the Court's
refusal in Qulloin and Caban to interpret Stanley as extending substantive
rights to putative fathers equal to the rights enjoyed by all other parents.
A- will he shnwn the Clnurt in Quilloi'n and Caban limited the broad
boundaries of Stanley; therefore, Stanley should be read narrowly as a proce-
dural due process case30 providing notice and a "properly focused" hearing
before a putative father's rights can be terminated. The type of hearing pro-
vided will depend on the nature of the relationship between the putative
father and his child as illustrated in Quillo'n.
28. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), "basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942), rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental," Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). "The custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparations for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). There is a fundamental right to privacy in matters relating to mar-
riage and family life. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). The right to have a family is a fundamental right. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977). See Comment, Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing on the
Child, 14 J. FAM. L. 547, 548-49 (1975-1976).
29. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
30. For the view that Stanle is a substantive due process case, see Comment, The Unwed
Father's Rights in Adoption Proceedings. A Case Study and Legislative Cnt'que, 40 Ata. L. REv. 543,
547-53 (1976). Note, however, that this comment was published before Quiloin and Caban were
decided. For the view that Stanly did not grant a fundamental right to putative fathers after
Quilloitn was decided, see Disanto & Podolski, The Right to va' and Trilateral Balancig--Implica-
tionsfor the Family, 13 FAM. L.Q. 183, 216 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Disanto & Podolskl]; Note,
Constitutional Lawe-The Rights of an Unwed Father in an Adoption Proceeding, 27 KAN. L. REV. 483,
488 (1979).
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Shortly after Stanley was decided, the Supreme Court remanded two
cases for reconsideration in light of Stanley.3 ' These cases merit attention
because they aid in defining Stanley's boundaries. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social
Services32 concerned an adoption proceeding, illustrating that Stanley is not
limited to custody cases but extends to adoption cases as well. Vanderlaan V.
Vanderlaan33 involved a custody dispute between divorced parents over two
children born following the divorce decree. Vanderlaan indicates that Stanley
applies not only to custody disputes between the state and the putative fa-
ther, but also to custody disputes between an unmarried mother and a puta-
tive father.
Further, the Stanley Court was unclear as to whether the rights of puta-
tive fathers who do not have actual custody of their children at the com-
mencement of the proceedings would be protected. Initially, the Court
noted that the cost of providing unwed fathers with an opportunity for in-
dividualized fitness hearings would probably be minimal.34 At a later point,
however, the Court employed more specific language and stated that all Illi-
nois parents were entitled to a fitness hearing before their children could be
removed from their custody. 35 In both Rothstein and Vanderlaan, however, the
putative father did not have actual custody of his children at the commence-
ment of the proceedings which indicates that actual custody is not a prereq-
uisite for Stanley to apply.
B. Limtihg Stanley: Quilloin
The issue of putative fathers' rights came before the Supreme Court a
second time in Quilloin v. Walcott.3 6 Quilloin sought to block the adoption of
his illegitimate child by the child's step-father. Quilloin never had and did
not seek actual or legal custody of his child. Under Georgia law,37 only the
consent of the unmarried mother was required before adoption of an illegiti-
mate child, whereas the consent of both parents was required before adop-
tion of a legitimate child. Since Quilloin had not legitimated his child either
by marrying the mother 38 or by a court proceeding, 39 his consent was not
required.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that Quilloin's sub-
stantive rights under the due process clause were not violated by applying
the best interests of the child standard in determining whether to terminate
his parental rights.4 ° Thus, Quilloin's rights could be terminated even
31. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970),
vacatedsub noma. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972); Vanderlaan v. Van-
derlaan, 126 11. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970) vacated 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
32. State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970),
vacated sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051.
33. 126 Il1. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970), vacated, 405 U.S. 1051.
34. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9 (1972).
35. Id. at 658.
36. 434 U.S. 246.
37. GA. CODE § 74-403(1)-(3) (1975).
38. GA. CODE § 74-101 (1975).
39. GA. CODE § 74-103 (1975).
40. 434 U.S. at 254.
1980]
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though he was not found unfit. The Court also held that the statute did not
violate equal protection because a state can constitutionally distinguish be-
tween a married father (even if later separated or divorced) and a putative
father.4 1 The basis for this distinction was that Quilloin had never
shouldered any significant responsibility for his child, whereas a married fa-
ther does shoulder significant responsibility for his child.
42
Quilloin's importance in determining the limited nature of constitutional
protection extended to putative fathers lies in three areas. The first lesson to
be learned from Quilloin is that while the Court is willing to grant substan-
tive rights to a putative father, it is not willing to give the putative father the
same substantive rights accorded to all other parents. The Quilloin Court
recognized that a putative father has a constitutionally protected liberty in-
terest in his child, and, therefore, is entitled to some degree of protection,
43
but the Court was unwilling to raise this interest to the status of a fundamen-
tal right.
This proposition is evidenced by the Court's action in allowing Quil-
loin's parental rights to be terminated without giving him a fitness hearing
44
and also in permitting his child to be adopted without his consent. The
Court stated that whatever substantive rights Quilloin might have, they
were amply protected by a hearing solely on the child's best interests.
45
Thus, Quilloin illustrates how the Court is limiting Stanley to procedural due
process. If the Court were reading Stanley as a substantive due process case,
then Quilloin's parental rights could not have been terminated as he did not
consent to the adoption and was not given a fitness hearing and found unfit.
The second significant aspect of Quilloin is the Court's discussion of the
factors relating to the putative father's relationship with his child that are
determinative of the type of hearing that a putative father will receive. 'Ihe
four factors that the Court considered important are whether the putative
father ever had actual custody of the child, whether the putative father par-
ticipated in the upbringing of the child, whether the putative father sup-
ported the child regularly, and whether the adoption would be by a family
with whom the child was already living.
46
Because Quilloin never had actual custody of his child, did not partici-
pate in the child's upbringing, only provided irregular support, and the child
was to be adopted into a family with whom the child had been living,47 the
41. Id. at 256.
42. Id
43. The Court stated that "we have recognized on numerous occasions that the relation-
ship between parent and child is constitutionally protected [under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment]" (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923)). The
Court also stated that "it is now firmly established that 'freedom of personal choice in matters of
. . . family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment'" (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)). 434
U.S. at 255.
44. The Court noted that Quilloin had not been found unfit. Id at 247.
45. Id at 254.
46. Id at 255-56.
47. The trial court found that during the eleven years of the child's life, before the adop-
tion proceedings, Quilloin did not petition to legitimate the child nor did he support the child
[Vol, 57:4
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Court was unwilling to extend the same protection to Quilloin that all other
parents receive, ie., a fitness hearing and consent to adoption. For a puta-
tive father like Quilloin, a hearing on the child's best interests was sufficient,
and his consent for adoption was not required.
The Court is implicitly stating that if a putative father does not accept
the same responsibility for his child presumably accepted by all other par-
ents, then he has no right to expect the same degree of constitutional protec-
tion. Stanl/y could be distinguished because Stanley had accepted full
responsibility for his children. Therefore, he was entitled to a fitness hearing.
Quilloin, on the other hand, had not. Therefore, he was entitled solely to a
best interests hearing.
The third facet of Quilloin that merits attention is the Court's holding
that a state can constitutionally distinguish between married and putative
fathers. 48 This holding adds still another limitation to the rights of putative
fathers. It also further supports the proposition that the interest of a puta-
tive father in his child is not fundamental. If it were, the Court would have
applied strict scrutiny to the classification. 49 Instead, the Court did not ex-
plicitly state which standard of review it applied to the classification, but
merely indicated that under any standard of review, the classification would
be constitutional.
50
The import of this holding is that a state may constitutionally provide
lesser standards for terminating a putative father's rights than for terminat-
ing a married father's rights, such as not requiring his consent or not finding
him unfit before his child can be adopted. The appropriate standard of re-
view would be either the traditional rational relation test 5 t or an intermedi-
ate standard of scrutiny 52 since neither a fundamental right nor a suspect
class is involved. 53 Under either of these tests, the classification would be
upheld unless the putative father could prove that he shouldered significant
responsibility as defined by the factors set forth in Quillo'n for the child simi-
lar to that of a married father. Since this is a heavy burden of proof, most
regularly. Also, the child had been living with the mother and stepfather when they filed a
petition to adopt the child. Id at 247, 249, 251.
48. Id at 256.
49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
50. 434 U.S. at 256.
51. Under the rational relation test, the statutory classification must bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
52. The intermediate standard of scrutiny requires that the classification serve important
governmental objectives and that it is also substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
53. The Court would probably apply the traditional rational relation test since the only
classifications that have thus far received an intermediate level of scrutiny are gender, Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and illegitimacy, Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972). Classifications which the Court has found suspect include race, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967), national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), and alienage,
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). The rights held to be fundamental by the Court are the
right to have a family, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the right of
privacy in marriage and family matters, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the right to vote, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621 (1969), the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the right of access to
courts, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958), and the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
1980l
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adoption statutes which distinguish between married and putative fathers
will pass constitutional muster.
Quilloin narrowed considerably the boundaries of Stanley in extending
constitutional protection to putative fathers. Caban added further refine-
ments to this newly emerging right.
III. ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STANLEY CABAN
A. The Court's Analysis of Caban
The Court decided Caban solely on equal protection grounds54 even
though Caban raised a substantive due process claim.5 5 Because the classifi-
cation involved gender, the Court properly applied an intermediate stan-
dard of scrutiny rather than the traditional rational relation test.56 Strict
scrutiny was not warranted as the classification did not involve a suspect
class57 or a fundamental right.
5 8
Under the intermediate standard of scrutiny, the classification must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives. 59 The statute in question fulfilled the
first part of the test as the Court recognized that the state interest in promot-
ing the welfare of illegitimate children through adoption is an important
governmental objective.60 But the statute failed the second part of the test
because the Court found that the gender classification was not substantially
related to the articulated state interest.
The Court gave three reasons for the statute's failure to meet the second
part of the test. First, a state cannot assume in all cases that an unmarried
mother has a closer relationship with her child than a putative father, and,
therefore, her interest in her child is more important so that only her consent
is merited in adoption proceedings. 6 1 The relationship that Caban had with
his children refuted this assumption as the Court recognized that his rela-
tionship with the children was "fully comparable" to the mother's relation-
ship with the children.
62
Second, there is no basis for assuming that putative fathers would con-
sent to adoption any less frequently than unmarried mothers thereby hinder-
54. 99 S. Ct. at 1768-69.
55. The Court avoided the substantive due process issue of whether parental rights could
be terminated absent a fitness hearing by claiming that since the statute was struck down on
equal protection grounds, it was unnecessary to reach the substantive due process issue. Id at
1769 n.16.
56. Beginning with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court has applied a higher level
of scrutiny in gender discrimination cases than the traditional rational relation test although not
as high a level of scrutiny as strict scrutiny demands. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward" In Search of Evolving Doctrite on a
Changing Court.- A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
57. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1.
58. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621. For the classifications that the Court
has found suspect and the rights that the Court has held to be fundamental, see note 53 supra.
59. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190.
60. 99 S. Ct. at 1767.
61. Id at 1766-67.
62. Id at 1766.
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ing the important state interest of promoting adoption of illegitimate
children.
63
Third, even if it might be difficult to locate and identify a putative fa-
ther at birth, possibly justifying a distinction between unmarried mothers
and putative fathers, this problem could decrease after infancy. 64 Allevia-
tion of this problem would require a carefully tailored statute which distin-
guishes between putative fathers like Caban who have manifested an interest
in their children and disinterested fathers.
65
Therefore, the Court concluded that the statute could not stand as it
was an "overbroad generalization" which the Court has repeatedly struck
down in gender discrimination cases.
66
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and
Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Stewart also filed a dissenting opinion stat-
ing that his reasons for dissenting were similar to those expressed by Justice
Stevens. 67 Both Justices viewed the classification as a permissible gender
classification based on the rationale that unmarried mothers and fathers are
not similarly situated in the majority of adoption proceedings. 68 Although
the majority avoided the substantive due process issue, both Justice Stewart
and Justice Stevens addressed this issue indicating that the statute did not
violate any constitutionally protected interest that Caban may have had in
his children.
69
63. Id at 1768.
64. Id
65. The Court stated that the equal protection clause would not be violated if a state did
not require the consent of a putative father who had never "come forward to participate in the
rearing of his child." Id at 1768. The Court added that for fathers like Caban, who had partic-
ipated in his children's rearing, "a State should have no difficulty in identifying the father even
of children born out of wedlock." Id at 1769. Therefore, a distinction between Caban-type
fathers and unmarried mothers could not be justified.
66. Id at 1769.
67. Id (Stewart, J., dissenting).
68. The reasons given by Justice Stewart and Justice Stevens to support their contention
that unmarried mothers and putative fathers are not similarly situated in the majority of adop-
tion proceedings stemmed from the biological relationship of the mother and child. Both Jus-
tices premised their arguments on the fact that the majority of adoptions involve newborns and
infants-not older children as in Caba=. Id at 1771 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 1774 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Stewart gave the following reasons: the unmarried mother bears the child, can
always be identified, and is the custodian of the child (absent state intervention) whereas most
putative fathers are unknown, unavailable, or uninterested. Id at 1771-72 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing). Stewart conceded that Caban was similarly situated to an unmarried mother because he
had established a paternal relationship with his children. He agreed with Justice Steven's argu-
ment, however, that the statute did not violate equal protection because Caban had failed to
bear his burden of proof of showing that the statute's "unjust applications are sufficiently nu-
merous and serious to render it invalid." Id at 1777 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further, "[tihe
mere fact that an otherwise valid general classification appears arbitrary in an isolated case is
not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire rule." Id at 1778 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
The reasons advanced by Justice Stevens were substantially the same as those given by
Justice Stewart. Justice Stevens summarized his reasons by concluding that "it is virtually inev-
itable that from conception through infancy the mother will constantly be faced with decisions
about how best to care for the child, whereas it is much less certain that the father will be
confronted with comparable problems." Id at 1775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id at 1770-71 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 1779-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19801
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
B. Limited Rights for the Putative Father
Two facets of Caban are of particular importance in understanding the
limited protection afforded to putative fathers. First, Caban illustrates that
Stanley did not declare the interest of a putative father in his child to be a
fundamental right; therefore, Stanley is not a substantive due process case.
Second, Caban extends the rights of putative fathers to include equal protec-
tion under the laws with unmarried mothers, but not without limitations.
Caban confirms that Stanley is limited to procedural due process. If the
Court had wanted to declare that the putative father's interest in his child
was fundamental, Caban provided an ideal opportunity to do so. The
Court's reluctance to address the substantive due process issue of whether a
putative father's parental rights could be terminated without showing him to
be unfit or without his consent, strongly implies that the Court is not going
to elevate a putative father's interest in his child to the status of a fundamen-
tal right.
70
In Quilloin the putative father's relationship with his child did not merit
declaring that the putative father had substantive rights equal to all other
parents. Caban, in contrast, had assumed all the fatherly duties that a mar-
ried father is expected to assume. He had shouldered the significant respon-
sibility for his children which the Quilloin Court found to be so important.
He regularly supported his children; he had actual custody of them both by
himself and with their mother; and he participated in their upbringing as
part of a defacto family. 7' He also acknowledged his paternity and wanted
to assume full parental obligations by adopting his children. 72 He was
found to be a fit parent. The only characteristic distinguishing Caban from
married fathers was that he had never married the children's mother.
In spite of all these factors, the Court refused to address the substantive
due process issue, dismissing it in a footnote as unnecessary to reach because
the statute in question was struck down on equal protection grounds.
73 If
the Court had addressed this issue and granted Caban the same substantive
rights that all other parents have under New York law, 74 this would have
created a fundamental right in putative fathers to their children. Since the
Court did not do so, it implicitly stated that the rights of putative fathers are
not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as the rights of all
other parents. This proposition is founded on the same considerations that
led to limiting Stanley to procedural rights and limiting a putative father,
such as Quilloin, to a hearing on the child's best interests.
70. For a similar view even before Quitloin and Caban were decided, see Comment, The
Emerging Constitutional Protection of tht Puative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581,
1592-97 (1972).
71. 99 S. Ct. at 1763.
72. Id at 1763-64.
73. Id at 1769. But see the dissenting opinions of Justice Stewart and Justice Stevens.
Both Justices thought it was necessary to address the substantive due process issue. Id at 1770-
71 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 1779-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Under New York law, the consent of married parents and unmarried mothers is re-
quired unless unfit. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 11 l(l)(b)-(c), (2)(a)-(e) (McKinney 1977). This
statute implicitly recognizes that a parent has a fundamental right to his or her child since
parental rights can only be terminated with consent or by a finding of unfitness.
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Moreover, in an adoption proceeding there are competing interests at
stake which must be balanced-those of the child and those of his parents.
7 5
By granting putative fathers the same rights as all other parents, but with no
guarantee that they would assume the responsibilities that other parents as-
sume, the Court would be giving the putative father an unqualified right to
block an adoption, absent unfitness, even though the adoption might be in
the child's best interest. The Court was unwilling to allow a putative father
to have the rights of parenthood without also assuming the responsibilities of
parenthood. This reasoning represents a careful balancing of the competing
interests at stake.
The second area of Caban's importance in determining the boundaries
of a putative father's rights rests in the equal protection holding of the case.
The majority decided the case solely on equal protection grounds holding
that a state cannot constitutionally require the consent of an unmarried
mother, but not the consent of a putative father, in an adoption proceed-
ing.
76
Thus, Caban extended the limited nature of a putative father's rights in
adoption proceedings to include the same rights given to an unmarried
mother.77 The Caban Court did not declare the putative father's interest in
his children to be a fundamental right because strict scrutiny was not ap-
plied to the gender classification. 78 The functional effect, however, of the
Court's holding is to give a putative father, who has assumed parental obli-
gations and responsibilities, a fundamental right in his children since the
adoption statute recognizes this right in the unmarried mother. 79 A father
like Caban cannot have his parental rights terminated without his consent,
absent unfitness.
The Court failed to specifically define what factors were essential in the
putative father and child relationship before the putative father would be
entitled to equal protection. The Court indicated that the putative father
was not entitled to equal protection if he had not participated in the child's
rearing.80 Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, viewed the majority
holding as quite narrow, limited to those adoption proceedings involving an
older child where the putative father has participated in the rearing of the
child and has admitted his paternity.8 '
Until the Court gives more explicit guidelines, courts will be struggling
to apply Caban to their adoption statutes which may result in confusion and
75. Seegenerally Disanto & Podolski, supra note 30, at 212-19.
76. 99 S. Ct. at 1768-69.
77. The extension, however, is not an unqualified extension to all putative fathers. See text
accompanying note 80 infta. Therefore, it may properly be viewed as a limited extension of the
rights of putative fathers as developed in Stanley and Quilloin.
78. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four Justices (Brennan, Douglas, Mar-
shall, and White) found sex to be a suspect class, but this position has never been adopted by the
Court as a majority.
79. See note 74 supra.
80. 99S. Ct. at 1768.
81. Id at 1777 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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misapplication. 2 For example, how should a court handle the case of a pu-
tative father and a newborn infant?8 3 The putative father has not yet had
time to participate in the rearing of the child, but does this mean that he is
not entitled to the same rights as an unmarried mother? What if he had
assumed all of the parental duties that a father of a newborn infant normally
assumes?
8 4
As a consequence of the Court's equal protection holding, adoption stat-
utes will have to be more carefully tailored to meet the intermediate stan-
dard of scrutiny to which they will be subjected. They must provide a
mechanism which distinguishes between those putative fathers who have
"manifested a significant paternal interest" 85 in their children and those pu-
tative fathers who have not. Otherwise, such statutes will be unconstitu-
tional under Caban.
CONCLUSION
The last seven years have witnessed the emergence of a new constitu-
tionally protected interest-that of the putative father in custody and adop-
tion proceedings. Stanley left open broad parameters for the development of
this right. The Court narrowed these limits considerably in Quilloin and
Caban resulting in a narrow reading of Stanley as a procedural due process
case requiring notice and a hearing before termination of parental rights.
Quilloin teaches that the content of the hearing will depend on the na-
ture of the relationship between the putative father and his child. Quilloin
also illustrates that a state may constitutionally distinguish between married
and putative fathers.
putative fathers in adoption proceedings as are accorded to unmarried
mothers, but the limits of this extension are uncertain. Caban also strongly
suggests that the Court is not willing to equate the rights of a putative father
with those of all other parents by giving the putative father a fundamental
right in his children.
These cases leave many issues open which the courts will be attempting
to resolve. For example, what constitutes significant paternal interest?
When has a putative father shouldered significant responsibility comparable
to that of a married father? Are the same standards applied to infants as to
older children? If not, what are the standards for infants?
One conclusion is certain. More litigation can be expected in this area
that will serve to further delineate the boundaries of a putative father's
rights. The outer boundaries of this right have been fairly well drawn by
82. Confusion reminiscent of Stanley seems inevitable. See generally Freeman, Remodeling
Adopttin Statutes After Stanley v. Illinois, 15 J. FAm. L. 385 (1977).
83. The position of the four dissenting Justices is clear. Caban would not apply to newborn
infants. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
84. Ifa putative father acknowledged his paternity at birth, paid for all expenses related to
the infant, and wanted to adopt the child or have custody of the child, the majority in Caban
would probably extend equal protection to this father because he had assumed significant re-
sponsibility for the child.
85. 99 S. Ct. at 1769.
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Stanloy, QuXloin, and Caban. What remains is a drawing of lines within these
boundaries to more narrowly define the constitutionally protected rights of
putative fathers.
Juzann J. Siloski

